University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Constitutional Commentary

1993

What Do You Think About the Twenty-Seventh
Amendment?
William W. Van Alstyne

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Van Alstyne, William W., "What Do You Think About the Twenty-Seventh Amendment?" (1993). Constitutional Commentary. 1139.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/1139

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

\

WHAT DO YOU THINK ABOUT THE
TWENTY -SEVENTH AMENDMENT?*
"What do you think about the twenty-seventh amendment," I
asked my aching head just last week. I was sitting at my computer
terminal at Duke Law School, papers littering the place as usual, at
my office in room 107. "I mean, what do you think about the second amendment," I caught myself muttering, trying to get things
more clearly in mind, using the description Walter Dellinger suggested was more to the point.
The amendment I was fussing over was not the proposed
twenty-seventh amendment many remember from having strongly
supported it in 1972 (the ERA-the Equal Rights Amendment).
Nor was it the Second Amendment so popular with the NRA (the
one about the right to bear arms). Rather, it is "the other" second
amendment-i.e., the original second amendment proposed as part
of the list of twelve amendments Congress approved for submission
to the states in its first session two hundred years ago, in 1789. The
first two of those proposed twelve amendments, unlike the whole of
the next ten in the list, had failed to attract more than six state
ratification votes. That's the "second" amendment that was bringing on the headache.
In an effort to clear some of my confusion away (all these numbers, all these dates), I swiveled my office chair about to remind
myself what this was all about. I turned to the framed copy of the
twelve original amendments Congress had submitted in 1789.
There it was, on the office wall next to the framed copies of the
Constitution and Magna Carta. And there, too, in handwritten sepia ink (now hard to read from having faded over time under glass
on my wall), were the original first and second Amendments that
failed to excite the support that had carried the day for the balance
of the list-the ultimate Bill of Rights whose bicentennial we passed
in remembrance in 1991:
Article the first .... After the first enumeration required by
the first article of the Constitution, there shall be one Representa• Editors' note: Our style manual tells us to capitalize constitutional amendments,
but fails to anticipate the problem discussed here. We have capitalized references to
amendments the legitimacy of which is beyond dispute.
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tive for every thirty thousand, until the number shall amount to
one hundred, after which, the proportion shall be so regulated by
Congress, that there shall be not less than one hundred Representatives, nor less than one Representative for f!llery forty thousand
persons, until the number of Representatives shall amount to two
hundred, after which the proportion shall be so regulated by Congress, that there shall not be less than two hundred Representatives, nor more than one Representative for every fifty thousand
persons.
Article the second . ... No law, varying the compensation for
the services of Senators and Representatives shall take effect, until
an election for Representatives shall have intervened.

Evidently the inspiration of the first of these unapproved
amendments, the one called "article the first," was to build into the
Constitution an initial assurance of substantial local accountability
for each House member (not more than 30,000 constituents per representative initially and not more than 40,000 until, using that basis
of reckoning, the House had two hundred members, and further
providing that the House would never have less than two hundred
members thereafter), while also providing that neither should the
House be permitted to grow to a size larger than necessary for there
to be at least one representative for each 50,000 persons. The measure looked forward. It anticipated future population growth and
up to a point it disallowed any measure that might dilute the personal, local representative nature of each Representative. In anticipating that growth, however, it also carried its own small
precaution against the possibility that the House might otherwise
become absurdly large unless its power to create additional seats
were limited in some degree. That precaution is expressed in the
last provision of the amendment, disallowing Congress to provide
more than one Representative for every fifty thousand persons once
the House achieved a size in which it would already contain two
hundred members. I
The inspiration of the "article the second" was obviously somewhat different-a precaution against too much self-interest in Congress in the use of its spending power to set its own salary and
emoluments as it might think best. Hardly a foolproof measure.2 It
I. As it turned out, this proposed ceiling (of not more than one additional Representative for each additional 50,000 persons once the House reached 200 members) would not have
done very much to have kept the House from becoming absurdly large. Given today's population, Congress would keep well within that restriction even were it to provide for a House
containing 5,000 Members (250 million people divided by fifty thousand). Fancy that.
2. Though not unprecedented, either. In fact, the Constitution has a provision of this
sort, i.e., one that postpones the effect of acts Congress may adopt when they are acts of a sort
most likely to benefit themselves. So, Article I, Section 6, clause 2 had provided (and even
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didn't even require any exceptionally large vote to pass such bills
(say, three-fifths or two-thirds affirmative vote to raise one's own
pay), as might quite sensibly have been proposed. Instead, it merely
postponed the taking of effect of any variation in compensation,
"until," as it says, "an election for Representatives shall have intervened." Moreover, it also contains a certain "Catch 22" of its own,
i.e., by no means is it just a proposal that would keep current Members from at once benefiting from raises they might be tempted to
vote themselves.J
Indeed, some keen observers of the time noticed that the proposal was not entirely a taxpayer's blessing-as it might be had it
simply forbade any congressional pay increase from taking effect
until after the next House election, where those who had approved
the increase would realize none of it until after successfully facing
an electorate whose taxes would be expected to support what they
had done. But the proposal contained in the original second
amendment is not just of this sort. It is also an "incumbents protection" act, or at least so it is in part, as some at the time quickly
figured out.
Note that it is "any variation" (and not just "any increase"),
the amendment disallows from taking any immediate effect. So the
proposal also provides a cushion for members in Congress against
the downside risk of constituent pressure to take less salary and benefits than they have been receiving, as might well happen, say, in a
recession or in other circumstances when the economy might be in
distress and the emoluments of office holding might seem to be unreasonably high in comparison with what others might earn: no
now still provides): "No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was
elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which
[office] shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been increased during
such time."
This generally forgotten clause, incidentally, has actually had more use than one might
suppose. For example, Senator Orin Hatch of Utah was a rumored leading prospect for
nomination to the Supreme Court just a few years ago but his chances were dimmed because
a general pay raise including the pay of Supreme Court members had recently been approved.
So, since the emoluments of being a Supreme Court Justice (the office to which he would have
been appointed) had been increased during his term of election, Senator Hatch became ineligible for appointment during the balance of his six-year term. And a little earlier, when
President Nixon named William Saxbe, a Senator from Ohio, to be Attorney General, this
clause temporarily barred the nomination for the same reason, i.e., the salary for that office
had then been recently increased pursuant to an act of Congress. But in this instance a
compliant Congress found a way out. It passed a special law lowering the Attorney General's
salary to its former level, after which Saxbe's name was resubmitted and he was then quickly
confirmed as Attorney General. (Query whether this made the matter constitutionally
kosher.)
3. In contrast, there is no similar "Catch 22" of the sort I'm about to describe, in the
provision in Article I, Section 6, clause 2, quoted in note 2.
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decrease Congress might vote in respect to its own compensation
could have any immediate effect on any of those voting to "accept" it
How nice, for Congress, that the amendment would have this
effect. And insofar as any such measure would be approved to affect the emoluments or pay of members of the House (and not just
the Senate where members serve for six-year terms), such legislation
as they would be approving would merely encumber their successors, and none of themselves during the whole balance of their term
of office. How fine for them. Perhaps it was partly in recognition of
this feature of the proposed amendment that the original second
amendment failed to draw more than six state ratification votes during the two-year period when all the rest, save itself and the First
were approved, in 1791.4
Even assuming some in the House might seek reelection (and
thus become their own successors), still, according to the very terms
of the amendment no such enacted decrease would affect them unless they were successful in being reelected. Well, that's not such a
bad thing looked at from their point of view. Were they not reelected they would have the strong consolation of knowing they
would thereby avoid having to live under the more modest standard
of compensation they had approved and which their successors in
tum would be forbidden to alter during their own first two-year
term.s
Looked at this way, the proposed amendment might even be
self-servingly politically useful to the more well-to-do members in
Congress. For they could use it insofar as they might be of a mind
to do so, as a means of discouraging prospective opponents. How
so? By approving a prospective decrease in compensation (which
prospective decrease the amendment itself would keep from having
any current effect on those voting it into law). By thus voting to fix
a lower compensation for a minimum of the next two years following the very next election, one might usefully discourage prospective candidates less well to do than oneself from even attempting to
seek the office--candidates unable to match the incumbent's campaign expenditures and unable to stay out of debt if made to depend
solely upon the lower compensation the office would unalterably
4. Actually, there is no reason to be coy about this matter, i.e., these were among the
reasons that drew misgivings to this amendment. James Madison himself, incidentally, expressed no enthusiasm in its behalf.
5. This is so, of course, because any such legislation, even merely to restore compensation to its previous level that those who voted to cut it had enjoyed, could have no effect until
still another election intervened-and this according to the amendment itself.
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carry for a minimum of the next two years. 6
So, much in the manner of certain misgivings that accompanied the original, unratified first amendment, the proposed second
amendment was subject to equivalent misgivings of its own. Even if
it were to be made modestly serviceable (say, simply to limit Congress from increasing its own benefits without some intervening
election), still this amendment was not suitable. 1 Rather, far from
simply accomplishing that task (that not all thought to be sound in
its own right), this amendment seemed to do something more, and
not all of it for the good.
Neither the original first nor second amendments, therefore,
were felt to be up to the same scale of the better drafted amendments of the time, i.e., the other ten amendments promptly ratified
as the Bill of Rights. And so matters passed into history two centuries ago, noticeable since then principally just on a few ornamental
office wall copies in faded sepia ink.
I

Presumably all this is indeed just a bit of forgotten legal history
even many readers of this journal might not be expected to know,
and why should they? Lacking framed sepia stained wall copies of
their own, even the best of us can be forgiven for not knowing what
a 204-year-old amendment happened to say or why it failed to make
the grade in 1791. Perhaps, one would say, if the matter came up
all over again, one could bestir oneself over trivial pursuits of this
kind. But only if Congress again proposed something like the original second amendment would it again become newsworthy. In the
meantime one not on a light teaching load may be pardoned for not
sharing any particular excitement of this sort. In a practical world,
in today's world, what does it matter what the original second
amendment may or may not have provided, or why it did not survive the contemporary scrutiny of those to whom it was submitted
for ratification in the existing state legislatures of two hundred years
ago, or why it was left behind?
Well, it might matter if one had a thought of life everlasting for
proposed amendments, a capacity of indefinite life, quiescent in incubant oblivion for mostly two centuries then suddenly born again
in a whole series of little-noticed resolutions by state legislatures,
6. This anticipated use of the clause was also given as one reason in opposition to the
proposed amendment at the time it was under active review.
7. Indeed, such an amendment would not look like this amendment. Rather, it would
look more like the comparable clause already written into the Constitution, in Article I,
Section 6, clause 2, quoted in note 2.
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the earliest 8 of any of the contemporary ones coming a full century
and eighty-seven years after the amendment failed as part of the
original Bill of Rights.
In fact, though, Congress evidently has a theory of just this
sort, though for some reason it did not care to have it reviewed (it
turned aside requests to hold hearings). For that is the story of the
twenty-seventh (or is it the second?) amendment. Preferring to
avoid anything calling attention to its salaries and emoluments in
this presidential election year,9 Congress has now declared the
whole task of proposing and of ratifying a new amendment as a task
already done. to
II

And so we now have a twenty-seventh amendment ... or do
we? I suppose we do (certainly Congress has said soli). Neverthe8. Wyoming, on March 3, 1978.
9. E.g., its own recent substantial self-approved salary increases, its House banking
practices, franking privileges, etc.
10. On May 21, 1992, by concurrent resolution Congress congenially declared the
twenty-seventh amendment to be "valid ... as part of the Constitution of the United States."
The vote was 99-0 in the Senate, 414-3 in the House. What a remarkable accord on a matter
of unprecedented constitutional novelty as this most assuredly was. Votes of this near unanimity seldom come (except, perhaps, on votes to recess or to adjourn). The longest time any
past amendment had actually taken to be ratified by the states was four years. The longest
time Congress itself had ever deemed appropriate was ten (actually seven years, beginning
with the Eighteenth Amendment, plus an added three-year extension belatedly approved in
the more recent case of the ill-fated ERA). One would have thought the novelty of the notion
of resuscitating the original second amendment by late ratifications counting two hundred
years after its sole proposal by Congress would have been worth a day or two of reflection in
House and Senate Committee review. But there was no such review, none at all.
II. Is this conclusive? Those who remember Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939),
may certainly think so for they will recall certain dicta by four justices that Article V amendment questions are "nonjusticiable" questions committed solely to Congress. Yet, if so,
here's a curious point. Professor Tribe recently published his view that the original second
amendment became a valid amendment the moment Michigan adopted its resolution of ratification (May 7, 1992), making it the thirty-eighth state (counting from 1789). In Professor
Tribe's published opinion (Wall Street Journal, May 13, 1992, at A IS), the amendment took
full effect on that date, period. Congress had no function to perform according to Professor
Tribe (a conclusion conveniently making it unnecessary for Congress to hold any hearings).
Virtually the same day, Professor Dellinger agreed with Professor Tribe's view in that he
emphatically agreed that no action by Congress was needed and that the constitutional status
of the original second amendment was not up to Congress, either. Washington Post, May 8,
1992, at A I. But there was a slight difference between the two, even so. The slight difference
such as it was was this: according to Tribe, the original second amendment was as of May
7th a new and valid part of the Constitution of the United States, whereas in Dellinger's view,
the original second amendment was not and could not be anything of the sort-because it had
lapsed more than a century before. (In short, were the amendment brought to Congress, it
ought not matter-because it was far, far too late.) See also Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking the Amendment Process, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 386,
425 (1983) (same point).
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less, in the Supplement to my casebook, 12 it will go in with an asterisk. And here's why. The explanation is just a personal way of
coping with the headache I've been unable to overcome in thinking
about Congress and how it sometimes behaves in matters of constitutional law. It goes also to what one thinks one owes to others just
as a teacher, in thinking about matters of this sort, and to try to do
so as best one can according to some larger constitutional sense of
general right or wrong.
Back in 1921, the Supreme Court actually addressed this very
question, about the original second amendment itself.I3 It did so
incidental to its discussion of a different issue then before the Court,
albeit a question also involving the timeliness of state ratifications
within some relevant period reasonably contemporaneous of the
date an amendment might be proposed. In taking on this question
(which, incidentally, it did not deem to be "nonjusticiable"), here is
what the Court unanimously declared, first starting at the logical
beginning place, namely, the text of Article V. Addressing that
text, the Court began its review in the following way. "It will be
seen that this article says nothing about the time within which ratification may be had-neither that it shall be unlimited nor that it
shall be fixed by Congress. What then is the reasonable inference or
implication? Is it that ratification may be had at any time, as within
a few years, a century or even a longer period; or that it must be had
within some reasonable period which Congress is left free to define?"I4 Then, having set the general framework for the ensuing
discussion, this was the Court's unanimously presented review:
We do not find anything in [Article V] which suggests that
an amendment once proposed is to be open to ratification for all
time, or that ratification in some of the States may be separated
from that in others by many years and yet be effective. We do
find that which strongly suggests the contrary. First, proposal
and ratification are not treated as unrelated acts but as succeeding steps in a single endeavor, the natural inference being
that they are not to be widely separated in time. Secondly, it is
only when there is deemed to be a necessity therefor that amendments are to be proposed, the reasonable implication being that
when proposed they are to be considered and disposed of presently. Thirdly, as ratification is but the expression of the approbation of the people and is to be effective when had in threefourths of the States, there is a fair implication that it must be
12.
1991).
13.
14.

William Van Alstyne, First Amendment Cases and Materials (Foundation Press,
Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921).
ld. at 371.
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sufficiently contemporaneous in that number of States to reflect
the will of the people in all sections at relatively the same pen"od,
which of course ratification scattered through a long series ofyears
would not do. These considerations and the general spirit of the
Article lead to the conclusion expressed by Judge Jameson [citing to Jameson on Constitutional Conventions, 4th ed., Sec. 585]
"that an alteration of the Constitution proposed today has relation to the sentiment and the felt needs of today, and that, if not
ratified early while that sentiment may fairly be supposed to exist, it ought to be regarded as waived, and not again to be voted
upon, unless a second time proposed by Congress." That this is
the better conclusion becomes even more manifest when what is
comprehended in the other view is considered; for, according to
it, four amendments proposed long ago-two in 1789, one in
1810 and one in 1861-are still pending and in a situation where
their ratification in some of the States many years since by representatives of generations now largely forgotten may be effectively
supplemented in enough more States to make three-fourths by
representatives of the present or some future generation. To that
view few would be able to subscribe, and in our opinion it is quite
untenable. We conclude that the fair inference or implication
from Article V is that the ratification must be within some reasonable time after the proposal. • • • Of the power of Congress,
keeping within reasonable limits, to fix a definite period for the
ratification we entertain no doubt.' s

III
Dillon v. Gloss is just one view of this matter, of course, but still
it is interesting, is it not? And might one expect that the deference
one branch of government owes another in this country would operate both ways, rather than in just one as Congress may suppose? It
has been often enough observed that the Court ought to be respectful of Congress, so not lightly to judge its powers, or lightly upset
what it does. It has also often enough been said that the Court
should second guess the constitutional positions taken by Congress,
if at all, only after the most careful inquiry and respect that is Congress's due. Certainly, however, one might expect this to work the
other way 'round as well, though it very seldom does. The story of
the twenty-seventh amendment is a story demonstrating that it does
not.
Dillon v. Gloss provided the Supreme Court's considered view
of what Article V requires in order that an alteration or addition to
15. Id. at 374-76. (Emphasis added). It is unusual to quote so extensively from an
Opinion by the Court, but in this instance it may be worthwhile.
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the Constitution be deemed to satisfy the Constitution. It is also a
compelling view, and it was measuredly ventured in a wholly noninflammatory way by a unanimous Supreme Court, a Court including
Holmes, Brandeis, and Edward White, the Chief Justice of the
United States. One might suppose Congress would provide good
reasons to suggest why it is not sound, if indeed it is not.
In Dillon, the Court expressly considered the idea of an amendment proposed (and never renewed) in one century, accumulating
ratifications in another "by representatives of generations now
largely forgotten," and whether it was capable of working ratchetlike, through ensuing centuries "by representatives of the present or
some future generation," to some lumbering, arithmetically successful end. It rejected the idea as being inconsistent with any sensible
understanding of the Article V extraordinary consensus. And, in
the Court's view, though Congress might anticipate this sort of matter and so in advance "fix a definite period," still, were it to do so
even its own provisions would need to "keep within reasonable limits," if it did. The notion of a proposed amendment with everlasting
incubant durability was turned aside (in the Court's view "quite untenable"), and the original second amendment was itself given as an
example of a proposal long since lapsed unless Congress wished to
renew it again by proposal, which it never did (and never has).
In the annals of the law, however, we have not seen much of
that reciprocity by Congress for the Court's views, as it expects for
its own. Certainly we have not seen much of it when Congress has
evidently been of the view that its own reelection interests.might be
disserved. And that is the actual story of the twenty-seventh
amendment.
Meantime, what shall one say of this amendment? How shall
we end this brief review? May an amendment proposed by a Congress in 1789 as part of a larger set, having failed to attract the
requisite consensus of state ratifications common to the rest of the
set during the era of its active consideration, and never renewed by
any later Congress during a time span of two hundred years, yet be
deemed to have survived for purposes of acquiring sufficient ratifications staggered over decades and centuries? In the Court's own one
recorded opinion, the answer is "No." Does Congress actually believe the contrary, moreover, or is it that Congress doesn't actually
have a belief at all? Perhaps that is more appropriate for you to say.
The view from Durham, however, for whatever it's worth, is to see
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Congress as through a glass, darkly, in the annals of its treatment of
our constitutional law.

William Van Alstyne**

••

William and Thomas Perkins Professor of Law, Duke University.

